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I. Argument Quality as Impersonally and Transculturally Conceived
Central to argumentation theory is the matter of the normative evaluation of
argument quality: that is, of argument normativity. Argumentation theorists are
concerned, among other things, with explaining why some arguments are
good, or at least better than others, in the sense that they provide reasons for
embracing their conclusions which are such that a fair-minded appraisal of the
arguments yields the judgment that those conclusions ought to be accepted --
are worthy of acceptance -- by all who so appraise them.
Such goodness is an epistemic matter. Argument normativity is a variety of
epistemic normativity, in that what makes an argument good is that its
premises provide reasons for accepting its conclusion. That is, the conclusion
ought to be accepted, on the basis of the support provided that conclusion by
those premises: the premises justify the conclusion, rendering it worthy of
belief.2
The feature of this view of argument normativity which is of concern in what
follows is its impersonal and transcultural character. The quality of a given
argument is impersonal, on this view, in the sense that its normative status is
independent of the person(s) evaluating that status.3 This is not to say that the
argument could be evaluated without a person to conduct the evaluation
(although some arguments can be successfully evaluated by machine). It is to
say, rather, that the quality of the argument is a feature of the argument itself,
rather than of the person(s) assessing its quality. Moreover, the quality of an
argument is transcultural in the sense that its normative status is independent
of the cultural locations and perspectives of its evaluators. It is the character of
such impersonal and transcultural evaluation, such that the quality of an
argument is as it would appear to a hypothetical ‘fair-minded’ evaluator --
rather than as it actually appears to actual, flesh and blood evaluators, with
their own cultural locations and perspectives -- that will occupy us in what
follows.
II. Argument Quality as Culturally Contextualized: Preliminary
Considerations
This impersonal, transcultural conception of argument normativity makes no
reference either to the attributes of the persons appraising the argument and
judging its normative force, or to the characteristics of the culture(s) to which
such persons belong or the cultural context in which the appraisal occurs. The
premises of the argument provide whatever support for its conclusion that they
do -- from no support whatsoever in the case of a really bad argument, to
extremely strong support in the case of a really good argument, with every
degree of support in between for arguments of every degree of quality --
whoever is conducting the evaluation, in whatever cultural context.
But recent work by a wide range of philosophers, argumentation theorists, and
social theorists rejects such an abstract, de-contextualized notion of argument
goodness. Instead, these theorists insist upon taking seriously, in the
evaluation of arguments, the features and perspectives -- and in particular, the
cultural locations -- of the evaluators. That is, such theorists emphasize the
importance of cultural differences in argument appraisal. Often locating
themselves under the banner of multiculturalism, they argue that the quality of
an argument depends upon culturally-specific beliefs, values, and
presuppositions. Consequently, they contend, no a-contextual4, culture-
independent characterization of argumentative goodness can succeed.
A considerable range of writers advocate the view that judgments concerning
the goodness or normative force of reasons and arguments (and cultural ideals
and values more generally) are inevitably, and perhaps necessarily, culture-
specific. Alasdair MacIntyre’s celebrated Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
(1988) announces in its very title the doctrine that rationality -- and so the
probative force of reasons, and so argument quality -- is in some sense
relative to cultural/historical tradition, and is in that sense neither impersonal
nor transcultural. MacIntyre writes that all rational activity is "inescapably
historically and socially context-bound" (1988, p. 4); elsewhere he suggests
that one "cannot find...any genuinely neutral and independent standard of
rational justification" (1989, p. 198) -- and so, presumably, any context- or
tradition-independent standard of argument quality.5 Jean-Francois Lyotard is
said to champion "the irreducibly local character of all discourse,
argumentation, and legitimation" (Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy 1987, p.
70); he holds, clearly enough, that what counts as knowledge and as
justification is itself relative to local, cultural context, and he rejects any sort of
transcultural ‘metanarrative’ that sets out standards of argument quality as
‘terroristic.’ (Lyotard 1987) More generally, those thinkers generally classified
as ‘postmodernists’ are typically regarded as holding that "rationality is always
relative to time and place," implying that argument quality is similarly relative.6
Perhaps the most visible writer in that somewhat vague classification is
Richard Rorty, who also rejects the possibility of personally- or culturally-
transcendent evaluation of arguments, and of cultures more generally.7 His
favored version of pragmatism famously rejects the search for "an
Archimedean point from which to survey culture" (1982, p. 150), in favor of a
frank embrace of ethnocentricity or ‘solidarity,’ according to which there is no
non-circular or non-question-begging way to justify our own ideals, values and
commitments to those who reject them in favor of their own, equally
ethnocentric alternatives: "We pragmatists...should say that we must, in
practice, privilege our own group, even though there can be no noncircular
justification for doing so" (Rorty (1989), p. 44) -- including, presumably, our own
group’s judgments and standards of argument goodness. David Theo
Goldberg helpfully summarizes and develops Rorty’s view as follows:
The traditional historical commitment of philosophical liberalism to
universal principles of reason and (moral) value presupposes
universal ideas like intrinsic humanity, human dignity, and human
rights -- values, that is, that are thought to mark individuals in virtue
of their very humanity. As Rorty insists, there is no transhistorical or
supersocial Godly view on which such universal (moral) principles
can be grounded or from which they can be derived. Axiological
concepts and values are necessarily those of some historically
specific community....Thus, any insistence on the universalism of
values must be no more than the projected imposition of local
values -- those especially of some ethnoracial and gendered
particularity -- universalized. (1994, pp. 17-18)
As Goldberg here suggests, Rorty’s ethnocentrism rejects the possibility of
‘universal principles of reason’ in accordance with which arguments can be
impersonally evaluated. While Rorty’s denial of the possibility of impersonal,
transcultural beliefs, values and ideals is in the first instance directed to moral
values and principles rather than to principles of ‘reason’ or of argument
evaluation, it is readily extended there, as Goldberg suggests:
Axiological relativism is bound to deny neither some basic formal
principles of thinking -- call them universal, if necessary -- nor
generalizable value judgments concerning especially pernicious
social conditions and practices. So, owning up to formal principles
of logical relation implies nothing about the assertive content of
thought....Logical formalism enables only that inconsistent and
incoherent claims for the most part can be ruled out; it is thoroughly
incapable of assertively promoting some coherent or consistent
standard over another. (16-17)
So, on the Rorty/Goldberg view, there may be universal ‘formal principles’ both
of ‘thinking’ and of ‘logical relation,’ but these will be insufficient to determine
the quality of ‘the assertive content of thought.’ With respect to the quality of
thought -- and, in particular, the quality of particular arguments -- such
determinations of argumentative quality cannot be other than the judgments of
‘some historically specific community,’ which may well differ from the
judgments of argumentative quality of other specific communities. How good is
a given argument, then? It appears that the Rorty/Goldberg answer to this
question can only be: it depends on the cultural identities and commitments of
its evaluators, and the cultural circumstances in which the evaluation takes
place. But appearances here may be deceiving.
As Rorty and Goldberg both acknowledge, their view suggests a problematic
form of epistemological relativism. Rorty explicitly rejects relativism, although it
remains unclear whether he is nonetheless committed to it8. Goldberg defends
‘a more robustly nuanced,’ ‘multicultural’ relativism, as the following two
passages indicate:
If the truth is relative simplistically to the group proclaiming it, then
all claims to truth, no matter how much they lack substantiation, are
on an equal footing. Pat Lauderdale has noted recently that the
critique of "objectivity" as veiling the imputation of Eurocentric
value has buried justifiable concerns about accuracy. A more
robust and more robustly nuanced conception of relativism
underpinning the multicultural project will enable distinctions to be
drawn between more or less accurate truth claims and more or less
justifiable values (in contrast to claims to the truth or the good).
(1994, p. 15, emphases in original)
Here Goldberg seems clearly to reject epistemological relativism -- at least the
‘simplistic’ form of it according to which ‘the truth is relative simplistically to the
group proclaiming it’ -- in favor of an epistemology that explicitly and
legitimately distinguishes ‘between more or less accurate truth claims and
more or less justifiable values.’ There is nothing here that the epistemological
‘absolutist’ need reject. His version of relativism is spelled out further as
follows:
...the relativism upon which a sophisticated form of critical
multiculturalism rests is not restricted to value particularism.
Multicultural relativism is ready and able to fashion general
judgments, that is, revisable inductive generalizations as the
specificity of (particular) circumstances and relations warrant.
These circumstances and relations will include often, though not
necessarily always, racial, class, and gendered articulation. Thus
multiculturalists are able to condemn a specific form of racism, say,
apartheid, in terms of a general judgment that racist exclusions are
unacceptable because they are unwarranted in a specifiable
scheme of social value to which we do or should adhere for
specifiable (and, perhaps, generalizable) reasons. But there is no
transcendental proof or grounds, no universal foundation, for this
scheme or any other. (1994, p. 19)
Here again what Goldberg calls ‘multicultural relativism’ seems not particularly
relativistic: it accepts that general judgments, e.g. that ‘racist exclusions are
unacceptable,’ can be warranted within ‘a specifiable scheme of social value
to which we do or should adhere for specifiable (and, perhaps, generalizable)
reasons.’ (emphasis added) The ‘scheme of social value’ is one to which we
should adhere for specifiable reasons, even if we (or some of us) do not in fact
so adhere: we would be wrong not to adhere to it, given the reasons which can
be offered for it. This seems not only not relativistic, but the very definition of
‘absolutism.’ (Siegel 1987, 1999)
Why, then, given his willingness to distinguish between more or less ‘accurate’
(15) or warranted claims, does Goldberg consider his view to be a ‘relativistic’
one? I can only speculate here, but there is considerable textual support for the
hypothesis that Goldberg regards his view as relativist because he rejects all
claims to "the truth" and "the good" (15), and to "transcendental proof or
grounds," and to "universal foundation[s]," for any particular scheme. (19) That
is, it appears that Goldberg is concerned mainly to reject foundationalism,
certainty, necessity, and transhistorical and supersocial Godly perspectives
from which claims to the truth or the good might be made, and to embrace a
thoroughgoing epistemological fallibilism. With all this the non-relativist can
happily concur. Whether or not this hypothesis is correct, the important point for
present purposes is that Goldberg’s ‘robustly nuanced multicultural relativism’
appears not in the end to hold that argument quality is relative to culture; it
holds, rather, that some cultural beliefs, values and practices can be
legitimately criticized on the basis of reasons which, while neither necessary
nor certain, are nevertheless good ones which we should acknowledge as
probatively telling even if we in fact do not. (Only thus are we (on Goldberg’s
view) within our epistemic rights to condemn racist exclusions as
‘unacceptable’ -- i.e. as wrong -- not just for us, who are already convinced of
the wrongness of racism, but for everyone, including the racist who does not,
but should, accept our scheme of social value on the basis of the reasons
which can be offered for it and which itself provides us with reasons adequate
to establish the unacceptability of such exclusions.)
If this analysis of Goldberg’s view is correct, that view in the end does not,
despite initial appearances, support a culturally relative view of argument
quality. But I hasten to acknowledge that other passages in Goldberg’s
discussion do seem to recommend such a view. I consider some of those
passages further below.
As is already clear, the thesis that argument goodness depends upon cultural
commitments and differences raises problems which also arise in the context
of discussions of epistemological relativism; in contemplating the former it will
prove necessary to consider the latter as well. In what follows, then, I will
discuss difficulties with the view that argument quality depends upon culture
which accrue to that view in virtue of its apparent embrace of a problematic
epistemological relativism; but I will consider other difficulties as well, which
befall it even if it avoids relativistic ones. While I hope in what follows to
acknowledge the genuine insights of a multiculturalist approach to argument
quality, I will argue that that quality is not rightly understood as dependent upon
cultural difference.
III. Four Difficulties with a Culturally Contextual View of Argument Quality
A. Transcendence. Central to the view that argument quality depends upon
culture is the claim, embraced by the view’s defenders -- and, as we will see,
by its critics as well -- that there is no possibility of ‘transcending,’ no escape
from, whatever specific historical/cultural9 location argument evaluators
happen to occupy. I consider next a version of the argument that defends that
view by appeal to this premise.10
One case for a personal, culturally sensitive -- rather than an impersonal, a-
cultural -- conception of argument quality depends upon a rejection of culturally
‘transcendent’ principles of argument evaluation and criteria of argument
quality. According to it, all such principles and criteria, however much they are
made to look universal or transcendent, are local; their status varies from
locale to locale. As Goldberg puts the point: "As Rorty insists, there is no
transhistorical or supersocial Godly view on which such universal (moral)
principles can be grounded or from which they can be derived....any insistence
on the universalism of values must be no more than the projected imposition of
local values...universalized." (18) If the values in question are those relating to
argument quality, this claim seems to lead directly to the culturally relative
conception of argument quality we are considering.
The point, it must be admitted, is widely acknowledged in contemporary
discussion: one can never completely escape one’s historical/cultural location,
with its associated perspective, framework, or conceptual scheme, and
achieve a ‘God’s eye view’ or a ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel 1986); all cognitive
activity -- including, of course, the evaluation of arguments -- is inevitably
conducted from some ongoing perspective or point of view. A typical
expression of the thesis is Quine’s:
The philosopher’s task differs from the others’, then, in detail; but in
no such drastic way as those suppose who imagine for the
philosopher a vantage point outside the conceptual scheme that he
takes in charge. There is no such cosmic exile. He cannot study
and revise the fundamental conceptual scheme of science and
common sense without having some conceptual scheme, whether
the same or another no less in need of philosophical scrutiny, in
which to work. (1960, pp. 275-6)
Philosophers generally grant Quine’s point: there is no ‘cosmic exile’ from all
conceptual schemes; one cannot cognize except from within the confines of
some scheme or other. As Goldberg puts it, there is no ‘transhistorical or
supersocial Godly view’ from which human judgments -- and in particular,
judgments concerning argument quality -- can be made. But from the relatively
uncontroversial claim that we cannot escape all perspectives and achieve a
‘view from nowhere,’ it seems a short step to the conclusion that principles of
argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality are themselves relative to
the cultural frameworks which inevitably limit our judgment; that, since there is
no ‘perspectiveless’ judgment, there is no possibility of achieving a
perspective which would allow us to judge the quality of arguments in a
culturally transcendent way. That is, the uncontroversial claim that all judgments
of argument quality inevitably occur in the context of some cultural location or
other might be thought to entail that all such judgments are therefore bound or
determined by such inescapable locations -- and so that what counts as a
good argument is problematically limited by cultural context in such a way, or to
such an extent, that a culturally relativistic view of argument quality inevitably
results.
However, it does not -- or so I will argue. The alleged entailment just mentioned
fails; even though we cannot attain a culturally transcendent perspective, in the
relevant sense we can nevertheless ‘transcend’ such perspectives in judging
argument quality. The key is to distinguish between transcending or escaping
any particular perspective from transcending all such perspectives. Once this
distinction is drawn, the ‘no transcendence, therefore argument quality is
relative to culture’ argument collapses.
Consider the question first in general terms, i.e. without regard to the specific
case of judgments concerning argument quality, and without restricting
ourselves to cultural frameworks or perspectives. Are we limited by our
perspectives, such that we cannot achieve any critical perspective on them?
Are we really ‘trapped’ within our perspectives in this way? Common sense
and every day experience indicate the contrary. Perhaps the most obvious
range of counter-examples involve the cognitive activities of children. Children
of a certain age, for example, can count and have a reasonable grasp of whole
numbers, but have no understanding of fractions or decimals, i.e., parts of
whole numbers. If asked ‘is there a number between 1 and 2?,’ they will answer
in the negative, and will be unable to comprehend any suggestion to the
contrary. But, given normal psychological/cognitive development, within a few
years such children will answer affirmatively; they will have no problem
recognizing that, e.g., 1.5 is a number between 1 and 2, and more generally,
that there are non-whole numbers. This seems a perfectly straightforward case
of the modification of a framework (or of the abandonment of one framework
for another) which belies the claim that we are trapped in, bound by, or limited
to our frameworks.11 (Scientific examples can equally easily be given, e.g., of
the recognition of the existence of things too small to see with the naked eye,
or of the interanimation of space and time and of the large scale non-Euclidean
geometry of the universe.)
Very different sorts of examples can also be given. Consider, for example, the
‘male sexist pig’ who has no awareness or understanding of women other than
as (sex) objects, but who in the course of his experience comes to realize (if
only dimly) that he does treat women as objects, that many women want not to
be so treated, and that there might well be something objectionable about
treating women in that way. Suppose that this benighted male comes
eventually to a full(er) awareness of the injustice of his earlier treatment of
women; he comes to believe that it is wrong to treat women as objects and,
over a considerable period of time and with the help of many women (and
perhaps some courses in the Women’s Studies Department), he develops a
radically different and more respectful view of women and (hallelujah!) treats
them accordingly. (Surely many men have had their consciousnesses raised to
some extent in this way in recent decades.) Here again it seems that our
subject has had his perspective altered and, indeed, improved; that is, he has
‘transcended’ his old sexist perspective for another.
In these examples not only have perspectives altered; the cognizers
considered all regard their later perspectives as improvements, i.e., as better
than, superior to, their earlier ones. If asked, these cognizers will be able to
offer reasons which purport to justify those judgments of superiority. Those
reasons, and the judgment that they are good ones which offer justification for
the superiority of those later perspectives, are of course made from the
perspective of those later perspectives or frameworks; they are not outside of
all frameworks or issued from a perspectiveless perspective. Thus is
acknowledged the uncontroversial premise of the argument under
consideration. But the conclusion is undermined by the several counter-
examples offered: epistemic agents always judge from some perspective or
other, but there is no reason to think that they are trapped in or bound by their
perspectives such that they cannot subject them to critical scrutiny. In this
sense, we can ‘transcend’ our perspectives; and this sense is sufficient to
defeat the general argument for the relativity of judgment to perspectives which
we have been considering. As Popper puts the point:
I do admit that at any moment we are prisoners caught in the
framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences;
our language. But we are prisoners in a Pickwickian sense: if we
try, we can break out of our frameworks at any time. Admittedly, we
shall find ourselves again in a framework, but it will be a better and
roomier one; and we can at any moment break out of it again. The
central point is that a critical discussion and a comparison of the
various frameworks is always possible. (1970, p. 56)
Here Popper clearly draws the crucial distinction which undermines this path to
relativism. While the Quinean point that there is no ‘cosmic exile’ from all
perspectives -- that we inevitably judge from some framework or other, and that
we cannot judge from a perspectiveless perspective -- must be granted, it
does not follow that our judgments are necessarily tainted by the fact that they
are made from some framework or other, or are ‘good’ only relative to that
framework. On the contrary, we can and regularly do ‘transcend’ our
frameworks from the perspective of other, ‘roomier’ ones, in which can fit both
our earlier one and relevant rivals to it -- and in this way fair, non-relative
evaluations of both our judgments and the frameworks/perspectives from which
they are made are possible.12
I have to this point been treating the general question of the degree to which
our judgments are determined by, and therefore relative to, our conceptual
schemes/frameworks/perspectives. The conclusion to which these musings
have led is that, while it is clearly correct that we cannot attain or judge from a
‘perspectiveless perspective,’ we nevertheless not only can but regularly do
attain sufficient critical leverage on our perspectives that we can criticize,
evaluate, and improve them -- and, consequently, that judgment is not inevitably
determined by or trapped within those perspectives. This general point is
directly applicable to the special case involving judgments of argument
quality.13 When we evaluate arguments, we inevitably do so from some
perspective or other. In particular, we do so from the particular
historical/cultural perspective in which we are embedded, with its own
particular principles of argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality.
Nevertheless, we are not ‘trapped’ within that perspective; our judgments of
argument quality are not wholly determined by it. Indeed, during the long history
of the development of principles of argument evaluation within
Western/European culture, many such principles have been altered as
theorists gained critical perspective on them. Particularly salient examples
involve the impact of the development of probability theory on principles of
argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality which touch upon
probabilistic matters, e.g. principles and criteria relevant to what are now taken
to be the gambler’s fallacy, the fallacy of hasty generalization, and arguments
whose cogency depends upon representative sampling.14 The moral of the
story is clear: while there is a clear sense in which judgments of argument
quality are embedded in particular historical/cultural locations, that sense is not
such as to challenge the impersonal and transcultural conception of argument
normativity with which we began. The argument in question -- we cannot
transcend our historical/cultural locations, therefore argument quality depends
upon the features of and is relative to those locations -- founders on the failure
to distinguish between ‘transcending’ all perspectives at once, and in doing so
judging from a perspectiveless perspective, and transcending any particular
perspective. The former is not possible, but the latter is not only possible but
quite common. In particular, judgments of argument quality admit of this latter
sort of transcendence. Consequently, this route to a culturally relative
conception of argument quality does not succeed.
The argument we have been considering rests upon a failure to distinguish
between transcending all perspectives, and transcending any particular one. A
related argument suffers from the opposite failing: it draws a sharp, but
ultimately untenable, distinction between the locatedness or particularity of
principles of argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality, on the one
hand, and the possibility of any ‘universal’ status for such principles and
criteria, on the other. It moreover regards these as contraries, and
consequently holds that principles and criteria relevant to argumentation, being
particular, cannot also be thought to be universal. I turn to this argument next.
B. Universality and Particularity Here, as we have already seen, Goldberg
clearly articulates the problematic dichotomy in question: "Axiological concepts
and values are necessarily those of some historically specific
community....Thus, any insistence on the universalism of values must be no
more than the projected imposition of local values...universalized." On this
view, all principles and values are local and particular; any claim to universality
is nothing more than "the imposition of [the] local values...of some ethnoracial
and gendered particularity." (18) The application of this view to principles and
criteria concerning argumentation is straightforward: they too are particular, not
universal; argument quality is dependent upon the particular location in which
evaluation takes place. So a given argument may (for example) beg the
question, and be judged to be of poor quality in a locale that takes a dim view
of that particular argument form, but be judged to be of high quality in a locale
in which that form is regarded with equanimity. To take a real example: any
argument of the form which we now call ‘the gambler’s fallacy’ was thought to
be a good argument in the environs of the Harvard logicians of the 1870's, but
is thought to be a bad argument in the rarefied atmosphere of the Emerson
Hall (where the Harvard Philosophy Department is housed) of today.15
Let us grant that all principles of argument evaluation and criteria of argument
quality are local and particular16, in the sense that they are inevitably
articulated and endorsed in particular historical/cultural circumstances -- just
(as granted above) as they are inevitably endorsed from some perspective or
other. Does it follow that they are therefore not universal? Two contemporary
denizens of Emerson Hall suggest not. Israel Scheffler writes: "I have always
supposed that the universal and the particular are compatible, that grounding in
a particular historical and cultural matrix is inevitable and could not conceivably
be in conflict with universal principles." (Scheffler 1995, p. 14) Hilary Putnam, in
commenting on this passage, agrees:
When we argue about the universal applicability of principles...we
are not claiming to stand outside of our own tradition, let alone
outside of space and time, as some fear; we are standing within a
tradition, and trying simultaneously to learn what in that tradition we
are prepared to recommend to other traditions and to see what in
that tradition may be inferior -- inferior either to what other traditions
have to offer, or to the best we may be capable of....
...[W]e are not forced to choose between scientism and skepticism
[or between ‘universalism’ and ‘particularism’]....The third
possibility is to accept the position we are fated to occupy in any
case, the position of beings who cannot have a view of the world
that does not reflect our interests and values, but who are, for all
that, committed to regarding some views of the world -- and, for
that matter, some interests and values -- as better than others. This
may mean giving up a certain metaphysical picture of objectivity,
but it does not mean giving up the idea that there are what Dewey
called "objective resolutions of problematical situations" --
objective resolutions to problems which are situated in a place, at a
time, as opposed to an "absolute" answer to "perspective-
independent" questions. And that is objectivity enough. (Putnam
1990, p. 178, emphases in original)
Putnam is here discussing principles of ethics rather than of argument
evaluation, and matters metaphysical as well as epistemological, but the
relevance of his remarks to our topic is clear. In regarding argument quality as
‘impersonal,’ ‘transcultural,’ or ‘universal,’ we are not denying that our
principles of argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality are local and
particular, in the sense that they are ours: articulated and endorsed by us, in
our particular historical/cultural context. But acknowledging their particularity
does not preclude us from proclaiming their universality: that is, their legitimate
applicability to arguments, considered independently of their location.
In holding these principles and criteria to be ‘universal’ or transcultural, we
need not deny their locality/particularity. Goldberg and Rorty are correct in
holding that all proclamations of universal principle emanate from particular
locales. It does not follow from this, though, that such values have no legitimacy
or force beyond the bounds from within which they are proclaimed or
embraced. The problematic move is to regard ‘particularity’ and ‘universality’
as contraries, such that a principle or criterion’s being one precludes it from
being the other. Elsewhere (Siegel 1997, pp. 174-8; Siegel (under review)) I
have offered both general arguments against regarding these as contraries,
and a range of examples, from mathematics, science, and morality, of claims,
theses, principles and criteria which are both particular and universal. I will not
repeat these arguments and examples here. I will instead content myself with
suggesting that, for the reasons given both here and there, this argumentative
path -- principles of argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality are
particular and local; therefore they cannot be ‘universal’ or ‘transcend’ their
locales; therefore argument quality is relative to historical/cultural location or
context -- does not succeed.
C. ‘Transcultural Normative Reach’ I believe that the two problems facing
culturally relative conceptions of argument quality just rehearsed are
formidable. The main difficulty with conceiving of argument quality in culturally
relative terms, however, is that any argument for that conception must
presuppose the impersonal, transcultural conception of such quality with which
it contrasts. As I will call it, any such argument must presuppose ‘transcultural
normative reach.’17 For any such argument will proceed from premises to a
conclusion which is said by its proponents to follow from those premises. That
it does so, if it does, will not be dependent on the cultural characteristics or
commitments of those either advancing or contemplating the argument. The
argument is taken by its proponents to provide good reasons for embracing its
conclusion, reasons which should be found compelling by any person who fair-
mindedly considers it. In this sense the argument’s quality -- the ability of its
premises to justify its conclusion -- is what it is, independently of the culture of
either the arguer or her audience.
Such transcultural normative reach must be accepted by any advocate of a
culturally relative conception of argument quality who thinks that her advocacy
is not only non-arbitrary, but rational -- warranted by the reasons offered in its
support. For an advocate who rejects such reach cannot regard herself as
advancing reasons which ought to persuade a fair-minded opponent, i.e., an
imagined rational and open-minded person interested in determining for
herself which conception of argument quality is more worthy of embrace.
Neither can she regard her embrace of the culturally relative view as more
rational than her opponent’s embrace of its rival. But this leaves her in a
troubling position: if she can’t offer such reasons, why should her opponent, or
anyone else, agree with her? If she regards her favored view of argument
quality as in any way rationally preferable to its alternatives, she must hold that
that view is supported by reasons which have force beyond the bounds of
those who happen to share her own presuppositions and commitments. In
short, the rational advocacy of and commitment to the culturally relative view of
argument quality presupposes the transcultural character of the normative
standing of arguments (and reasons) as such.18
It is important to recognize that this ‘transcultural normative reach,’ which I am
claiming must be acknowledged by all parties to the debate concerning
argument quality, does not depend upon the presumption that judgments
enjoying such reach must be issued from some impossibly neutral perspective.
Earlier we saw that Goldberg and Rorty reject the possibility of universal
principles or values -- including those concerned with argument quality -- on the
grounds that any such principles must stem from a ‘transhistorical or
supersocial Godly’ perspective, and there simply is no such perspective
available, at least to the likes of us. Goldberg and Rorty are right about the
unavailability of such a perspective, and, if such a perspective were to prove
necessary for arguments to enjoy transcultural normative reach, they would be
right to reject such reach. But it is not. Let us grant that there are no universal or
transcultural values in the sense that they are grounded in, or derived from, a
perspective outside of history and culture, for there simply is no such ‘Godly’
perspective available. This is not the sense of ‘transcultural’ relevant here. All
that is required for argumentative principles and criteria to be, in the relevant
sense, transcultural, is that it is possible that reasons offered for particular
conclusions be such that a fair-minded contemplation of those reasons will
result in such conclusions being deemed worthy of acceptance on the basis of
that contemplation, independently of the cultural heritage and commitments of
those doing the contemplating. And this possibility, we have seen, is
presupposed by any argumentative advocate of any conclusion whatsoever --
and a fortiori by the advocate of the culturally relative view of argument quality.
Consequently, that advocate, like every other, must accept the viability of what I
have been calling ‘transcultural normative reach’ -- and must therefore reject
the culturally relative view of argument quality, which is incompatible with it.
A parallel point is powerfully made by Robert Fullinwider:
Consider the case of Christopher Columbus: did he discover
America or invade it? From the perspective of fifteenth century
Europe, he discovered it. From the perspective of the Arawak and
other indigenous American populations, he invaded it. As
descendants of the European immigrants of America most of us
take (or took) the perspective of Europe. Why should we give it up
or modify it? Because it is inadequate in some way? Saying it is
amounts to measuring it against something outside itself, some
more comprehensive and better point of view.
However, the strong separatist denies there are any overarching
perspectives, just other perspectives. Now, no other perspective
can claim to supercede our own merely by being other. If an
Arawak-centered perspective is no better than a Eurocentric
perspective or no part of a more comprehensive synthesis, why
bother to re-write the books on poor Columbus? The ironic
implication of strong perspectivism is that the label "Eurocentric"
ceases to be a charge, complaint or criticism; it becomes a mere
description. (Fullinwider 1991, p. 14, emphases in original)
Fullinwider’s ‘strong perspectivist’ may for present purposes be identified with
the advocate of a culturally relative view of argument quality; the lesson of the
example is the same for both. Since the strong perspectivist denies the
possibility of overarching perspectives in terms of which particular, local
perspectives can be evaluated, she denies herself the ability to criticize any
such particular perspectives. More tellingly for present purposes, in doing so
she likewise denies herself the ability to criticize alternatives to her favored
‘strong perspectivist’ view, and to defend as rationally superior to its
alternatives that view itself.
Similarly, by denying the possibility of overarching, transcultural principles of
argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality, the advocate of a
culturally relative view of argument quality denies herself the ability to criticize
particular, culture-bound argument-related principles and criteria; and, in doing
so, likewise denies herself the ability to criticize alternatives to her favored
culturally relative view, and to defend as rationally superior to its alternatives
that view itself. But her whole purpose, qua advocate of that view, is to
establish its superiority. Consequently she must, in order to advocate it, accept
rather than deny the possibility -- and indeed the actuality -- of overarching,
transcultural principles of argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality.
That is, she must accept ‘transcultural normative reach,’ and, as above, must
therefore reject the culturally relative view of argument quality which is
incompatible with it.19
D. Argumentation, Rhetoric, and Power A final worry, which I can treat only
briefly here, concerns a kind of skepticism toward the very idea of
argumentative or epistemic normativity. The claim that a given argument is a
good one, in that its premises provide justification for its conclusion, is (it may
be said) not really a claim about normative status at all, since there is ‘in the
world’ no such thing. Such claims, rather, are simply rhetorical devices, which
serve to mask the exercise of power. My persuading you that you ought to
believe a conclusion C because it is well supported by its premises P, or that
certain standards of probative support (which I endorse) are the standards by
which you should judge such support, is simply an exercise of my power over
you. That certain principles and criteria of argument quality are seen as
legitimate is itself no more than a reflection of the power enjoyed by those able
to establish them as such. That some items are thought to be ‘good reasons’
while others are not is -- as van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Henkemans et.
al. put it in their helpful review20 of recent work on argumentation,
communication and rhetoric -- "systematically to privilege certain kinds of
claims over others." (1996, p. 209). As they point out, this claim:
points to the nexus between argumentation and power. It is power,
whether political, social, or intellectual, that permits one to stipulate
what sorts of claims "count" in any argumentative situation. Power
enables those who hold it to impose a partial perspective as if it
were holistic -- the definition usually given for the term hegemony.
The most recent wave of argumentation studies seeks to explore
and expose the tendency of power to foreclose discourse, and it
seeks emancipation by opening up alternatives. This project
focuses on marginalized arguers and arguments, and is given
impetus by the widespread concern for matters of race, gender
and class.
The intellectual underpinning of argument-as-critique is
"postmodernism"....There are many varieties of postmodernism,
but the central core seems to be the denial that there are any
verities or standards of judgment, and the claim that what passes
for such standards really is socially constructed. In its...location of
argument in communities, this perspective is in some measure
consistent with the others we have discussed. But it goes on to
argue that only a part of the relevant community has defined the
standards, then hegemonically imposed them on the whole. The
goal of critique is thus to shed light on this practice and to promote
emancipatory potential by posing alternatives. (1996, p. 209,
emphases in original)
As these authors point out, one "implication...of the postmodern project...is the
denial that there can be any such thing as communal norms or standards for
argument." (209)21  The claim, and the argument for it, can perhaps be
summarized as follows: ‘Rational argument’ is really just a form of rhetoric. The
use of rhetoric is the exercise of power. Judgments of argument quality are
likewise rhetorical exercises of power. Thus the impersonal, transcultural view
of argument quality defended above can be seen only as an equally rhetorical,
power-laden construct; it can be no more than a tool of power wielded to further
marginalize those not involved in its construction but expected to judge in
accordance with its dictates.
This is a fundamental charge; as such adequate treatment of it requires more
attention than I can give it here.22 But three points in reply seem in order. First,
this skepticism concerning the very idea of argument quality (other than as an
exercise in power) plagues culture-relative as well as transcultural views of
argument quality, since according to it the former as well as the latter are mere
rhetorical exercises of power. Consequently, it does not offer a reason for
preferring the former to the latter (or vice-versa). Second, it is unclear why this
view of argumentation should be itself embraced. If the application of
standards of argument quality is just a rhetorical exercise, with no genuinely
normative epistemic force (which renders the conclusions of some arguments
worthy of belief), there seems to be no reason to embrace this rhetorical view
of argumentation and judgments of argument quality either. The rational
defense of the view requires that some rhetorical efforts are more probatively
forceful, and some exercises of rhetorical power more legitimate, than others --
and so, that argument quality is not merely a matter of rhetoric and power.
Of course, the ‘advocate’ of the view might simply shrug off the debate
concerning the relative merits of her view versus opposing views, regarding all
such ‘rational’ debate as merely rhetorical exercise; she may, in denying any
sense of ‘rational superiority’ other than the rhetorical/power one here being
considered, be flatly uninterested in establishing the rational superiority of her
view. This stance embodies an admirable consistency, but it comes at a high
price: in adopting it, and so rejecting the very possibility of rational advocacy of
her view, this ‘advocate’ seems clearly enough not to be engaging the issue
with which this paper is concerned. Indeed, taking this stance would render its
defense logically impossible; it would make it impossible either to advocate
the view in question as rationally preferable to its alternatives, or to engage the
general issue of the relative merits of the rival views of argument quality we
have been considering. Consequently, while the stance in question appears at
first blush to constitute a possible position to take with respect to that issue,
taking it not only renders that position indefensible, it renders the issue itself
incapable of being coherently posed -- in which case it cannot be seen as an
adequate stance to take with respect to that issue.23
There is, obviously enough, much more to be said here. Nevertheless, I hope to
have said enough to make it clear that the view of argumentation as rhetorical,
and as fundamentally the exercise of power, has no tendency either to upend a
transcultural view of argument quality or to support a culturally-relative view of it.
IV. Conclusion
I have argued that while there is much merit in the general multiculturalist
perspective on argumentation -- it rightly warns us against impossible
‘perspectiveless’ perspectives and ‘Godly’ perspectives outside of time,
space, and culture; and rightly reminds us that argument evaluation is
conducted by flesh-and-blood people in specific historical/cultural locations,
that it takes place in a context -- the multiculturalist argument against
impersonal, transcultural conceptions of argumentative quality fails. It fails, first,
because its criticism of the possibility of ‘transcendence’ depends upon a
conception of transcendence which, although rightly rejected, is far stronger
than that required by a transcultural view of argument quality. It fails, second,
because it depends upon a sharp ‘universal/particular’ dichotomy which is in
the end untenable. Most fundamentally, it fails because it itself presupposes
just the impersonal sort of argumentative quality it seeks to reject: that of
transcultural normative reach. Finally, it gains no support from regarding
argumentation as the rhetorical exercise of power.
I conclude that the transcultural conception of argument quality survives at least
the multiculturalist challenges to it discussed here.
NOTES
1I am grateful to the Spencer Foundation, the National Endowment for the
Humanities, and the University of Miami for their support.  The views
expressed are of course solely my own responsibility.  This paper was
presented at a session sponsored by the Association for Informal Logic and
Critical Thinking (AILACT) at the World Congress of Philosophy in Boston,
August 1998; I am grateful to Jonathon Adler for the invitation to participate in
the session and to those in attendance for their stimulating reactions.
2For further articulation and defense of this epistemic conception of
argumentation, see Feldman 1994, Lumer 1991, Wreen 1997, Biro and Siegel
1992, and Siegel and Biro 1997; for criticism see Adler 1997a and 1997b. 
For more general consideration of epistemic normativity (in the context of
consideration of 'naturalized' epistemology), see Siegel 1996 and 1996a and 
references therein.
3Feldman 1994 appears to disagree, as his treatment relativizes argument
goodness to persons: the same argument on Feldman's view can be a good
one for you but a bad one for me.  But I believe that this apparent relativization
to persons is in fact relativization to the evidence that a given argument
evaluator has at the time of evaluation.  The latter sort of relativization,
according to which the quality of an argument depends upon the probative
strength of the relevant, available evidence utilized in its premises, is the very
hallmark of the epistemic view.  Thanks to Richard Feldman for helpful
conversation and correspondence on this point.
4Such theorists can thus also be categorized as 'contextualists', who hold that
standards of argument quality differ from context to to context, culture being
one such context-type.  For references and critical discussion, see Combs
1995.  For insightful discussion of possible cultural bias inherent in critical
thinking itself, see Ennis 1998.
5Although I must immediately concede that on MacIntyre's view relativism can
be 'transcended.'  For discussion of MacIntyre's view of rationality and
relativism, see Siegel 1999.
6The quoted passage is taken from Carr (1995, p.80), which offers a general
and plausible characterization of the central themes of postmodernism.  For
critical discussion see Siegel (1990a).
7This paragraph borrows from Siegel (under review).
8For discussion of Rorty and relativism, see Siegel (1999).
9There is, presumably, equally no ready escape from our gendered, class, and
other locations.  For ease of exposition I will treat these further dimensions of
our locations and identities as understood.  I also acknowledge the vexed
problem of the constitution and individuation of 'cultures,' which I make no effort
to address here.
10What follows is adapted from Siegel (1999), to which the reader is referred
for further discussion.
11Children typically attain a 'a reasonable grasp of whole numbers' by age
three or four.  Grasp of fractions and decimals usually involves a process which
extends over several years and is presumably in part a function of what is
taught, when.  The classic work in this area is Gelman and Gallistel 1978; it
(including their account of what counts as a 'reasonable grasp' of numbers) is
summarized briefly and lucidly in Moshman, Glover and Bruning 1987, pp. 420-
423.  Thanks to David Moshman for helpful advice on matters concerning
psychological development.
12For critical discussion of Popper's view, and of 'framework relativism' more
generally, see Siegel 1987, ch. 2; for consideration of this issue in the context
of arguments for/against naturalized epistemology, see Siegel 1995, esp. pp.
50-1; for more general discussion of the possibility of 'transcendence,' see
Siegel 1997.
13It is equally applicable to the special case involving specifically cultural
context.  The example involving a sexist perspective I trust makes this clear.
14For discussion of epistemic status of these and other examples, including a
sharp change of judgment concerning the legitimacy of the gambler's fallacy,
see Siegel (1992).
15For discussion and references, see Siegel 1992, p. 33.
16Of course persons are also particular; all people are, in Seyla Benhabib's
words, "embodied and embedded" (1992, P.6), and have to be understood
such by philosophers if they are to avoid "the metaphysical illusions of the
Enlightenment." (4)  Benhabib strives to reformulate "the universalist tradition
in ethics" (9) in such a way that it respects the "concrete other" as well as the
"generalized other" (158ff.); she too rejects the universal/particular dichotomy I
am challenging in this section.
17This section is adapted from and builds upon the discussion of 'transcultural
normative reach' in Siegel (under review).
18This parallels the analysis of (and argument against) epistemological
relativism offered in Siegel 1987, ch. 1 and rehearsed in Siegel 1999.
19She must, moreover, argue that from the perspective of those transcultural
principles and criteria her favored of argument quality proves to be superior to
its rivals.  Here she runs into the well-rehearsed incoherence arguments
against the relativism implicit in her view, since that view centrally denies the
possibility of 'transcultural superiority' which it must nevertheless claim for
itself.  I will not rehearse again those arguments here.  They are laid out in
some detail in Siegel  1987 and 1999.
20The review in question appears as chapter 7 of their 1996.  They are here
reviewing the literature concerning this point, not endorsing it.
21For detailed discussions pro and con, see the several essays collected in
Simons and Billig 1995 and Cherwitz and Hikins 1995.
22I have addressed various aspects of it, though not in the context of
argumentation theory, in Siegel 1997.
23This point is developed further in Siegel 1987 and 1999, and in Siegel
1997, ch.5.
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